There were 69 non-egregious, non-self-disclosed violations of the WMD Regulations and Executive Order 13382, with a base penalty of $14,063,000. In 2008 and 2009, these transfers, totalling $41,306,113, were sent to Bank Melli Iran ZAO through SWIFT. Instead of references to Melli, Iran or the bank's SWIFT code, Bank of Moscow used abbreviations like”BMI CJSC”. All these payments went straight-through US banks without manual intervention.
Here is OFAC's recitation of why the penalty ended up where it did:
OFAC considered the following to be mitigating factors:
- Bank ofMoscow has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five yearspreceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the alleged violations;
- Bank ofMoscow took remedial action to improve compliance with U.S. sanctions laws and regulations;and
- Bank of Moscow cooperated with OFAC’s investigation by signing a statute of limitationstolling agreement.
OFAC found the following to be aggravating factors in this case:
- Bank ofMoscow failed to exercise an appropriate degree of caution or care in avoiding the conduct thatled to the alleged violations;
- Bank of Moscow’s conduct resulted in significant harm to U.S.sanctions program objectives;
- Bank of Moscow is a large and commercially sophisticatedfinancial institution; and
- Bank of Moscow does not appear to have had adequate compliancepolicies or procedures in place at the time the alleged violations occurred.
This enforcementaction highlights the particular sanctions risk faced by foreign financial institutions that maintain accounts for persons subject to OFAC sanctions and conduct significant business through theU.S. financial system.
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Posted with BlogsyFiled under: OFAC Updates, Settlements, Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Sanctions
